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Real Property
By George A. Pindar*

The period of this survey includes a great quantity of judicial writing
from the Georgia appellate courts dealing with difficult problems and often
accompanied by sharp and persuasive dissenting opinions.

I.

AcTIONs FOR LAND

There is an ancient rule in the law of ejectment that a plaintiff may
recover upon his prior possession alone as against one who subsequently
acquires possession by mere entry without lawful right.' In Doe v. Roe ' the
plaintiff's only claim of title was under a quitclaim deed, obtained only two
years before the suit was filed, from one who had no title of any kind. The
plaintiff erected a fence, but it was soon removed by the adjoining-property
owner, who was the defendant's predecessor in title. The court denied the
plaintiff recovery on prior possession alone because the defendant's pulling
down the fence was not a "mere entry without lawful right" within the rule.
True, the defendant could not prove that he entered under a perfect title,
but he did show a chain of title in excess of 40 years;3 the only weakness
was that it included three tax deeds to Lee County4 that the county had
quitclaimed to defendant's predecessor in title four years before the suit
was filed. The quitclaim from the county was illegal as a redemption deed,
because it was not made to the defendant in fi. fa. or to his creditor; so a
valid sale could have been made by the county only at public outcry to the
* Partner in Gershon, Ruden, Pindar & Olim, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University (J.D.,
1927). Member of the Georgia Bar. Author of AMERICAN REAL ESTATE LAW (1976) and GEORGIA
REAL ESTATE LAW & PROCEDURE (1971).

1. Dahlem v. Abbott, 153 Mich. 465, 116 N.W. 1007 (1908); Donahue v. Illinois Cent. R.
Co., 165 Ill. 640, 46 N.E. 714 (1897); GA. CODE ANN. §33-102 (1970); Brunswick Land Corp.
v. Perkinson, 146 Va. 695, 132 S.E. 853 (1926).
2. 234 Ga. 127, 214 S.E.2d 880 (1975).
3. A 40-year chain of title makes out a prima facie case in ejectment under GA. CODE ANN.
§38-637 (1974.). A history of this type of legislation may be found in L. SIMES & C. TAYLOR,
IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION 317, 340 (1960) [hereinafter SIMES & TAYLOR].
A similar statute (30 years) is discussed in Campbell v. Mayberry, 12 N.C. App. 469, 183
S.E.2d 867, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 726, 184 S.E.2d 883 (1971).
4. Tax deeds are always unreliable as sources or links of title. Annot., 115 A.L.R. 140
(1938), and Annot., 57 A.L.R. 1456-1472 (1928); Young, The Tax Deed-Modern Movement
Toward Respectability, 34 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 181 (1962); SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at
173-186.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

highest bidder.5 Nevertheless, the court considered the quitclaim at least
effective as color of title and thus sufficient to justify an entry by the
defendant. The case again illustrates the reluctance of modern courts to
adhere strictly to the ancient prior-possession principle and a willingness
to accept an otherwise defective title as sufficient to shift the burden back
to the plaintiff. Ownership of land should never turn on whether the parties
are tagged as plaintiffs or defendants
In Mathews v. Brown,7 an ejectment suit was brought against one who
occupied as a tenant under a landlord not named as a defendant in the
action. The landlord took over the defense of the suit but in the name of
his tenant, following the old procedure. But the 1966 Civil Practice Act,
like its federal counterpart, requires that litigation proceed in the name of
the real parties in interests and permits the court on its own motion to
make new parties for this purpose The court therefore ordered the trial
judge to enter an order formally naming the landlord as a party defendant.
It was settled under the old law that plaintiffs in possession were not
entitled to maintain ejectments, since they were basically actions for possession and the plaintiffs already had what the court was asked to deliver."
McNeil v. Schwall" applied this principle in affirming a directed verdict
for the defendant. But the case raises questions which are not clarified by
the facts stated. Under the 1966 Civil Practice Act and similar provisions
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," the forms of action are abolished,
and plaintiffs, except in cases of default judgments, are not denied relief
to which they are entitled simply because they may have misconceived the
nature of their causes of action. Here the plaintiff was the assignee of a
purchaser whose contract required installment payments over a ten-year
period beginning in 1964. If he proved his assignment and the making of
all required payments, why is he not entitled to a judgment affirming his
3
equitable title to the property despite the misnomer in the complaint?
5. GA. CODE ANN. §92-8301 (1974). The court said Lee County had acquired title by
prescription but cited no evidence that the county had ever gone into possession; the court
relied instead upon GA. CODE ANN. §92-8315 (1974), which attempts to make tax titles irredeemable after seven years but does not foreclose questions as to the validity of the sale.
Carnes v. Pittman, 209 Ga. 639, 74 S.E.2d 852 (1953).
6. Much of the strategy of land litigants in the old days was directed toward attaining
the status of defendant rather than plaintiff to allow recovery on the weakness of the plaintiffs' title without having to prove any title of their own. Such efforts led to violence and arenot favored in modern jurisprudence.
7. 235 Ga. 454, 219 S.E.2d 701 (1975).
8. GA. CODE ANN. §81A-117 (1972).
9. GA. CODE ANN. §81A-121 (1972). For an example of the older procedure, see Sanford v.
Tanner, 114 Ga. 1005, 41 S.E. 668 (1902). Accord: Freeman v. Holland, 122 So.2d 791 (Fla.
App. 1960); Hunter v. Wethington, 205 Mo. 284, 103 S.W. 543 (1907).
10. Vinson v. Cannon, 213 Ga. 339, 99 S.E.2d 108 (1957).
11. 236 Ga. 109, 223 S.E.2d 80 (1976).
12. GA. CODE ANN. §81A-154(c) (1972); FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c).
13. See discussion of a similar problem under the heading of "Partition," infra, in the text
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THE TIDEWATER PROBLEM

In State v. Ashmore'4 the supreme court was confronted with grave problems with the ownership and status of tidelands along the 100 or more
miles of seacoast facing the Atlantic Ocean and its bays and estuaries. The
same court in 1902 had announced the well established common-law rule
that the boundary of abutting owners was "the ordinary high-water
mark."' 5 That meant that the base fee in beaches and marshes was owned
by the state, just as it had vested in the Crown under English law, although
a right of access to the ocean was generally conceded to belong to abutting
owners. Immediately after the decision the oyster industry was able to
obtain the enactment of a statute that on its face appears to extend the
boundaries of adjacent owners "to low-water mark in the bed of the water,"
subject to a reservation against "exclusive appropriation . . . by any person whomsoever" if the "appropriation" would prevent passage and
freight-transportation.'" But the Georgia Constitution prohibited then as
it prohibits now "gratuities" in the form of gifts of public funds or property
to private persons.' 7 Since many lawyers doubted the constitutionality of
the statute, the oyster industry was discouraged from making any large
investments along the Georgia coast. Therefore, in the new Constitution
of 1945 a paragraph was inserted ratifying and confirming the statute."s
The validity of this ratification was accepted by the majority opinion, and
the court proceeded to a construction of the statute itself. Quoting from
the minutes of the 1943-44 Constitutional Commission, the court concluded that the act was regarded as dealing only with "rights" in the water
beds, not "title" to the land itself. The intention, said the court, "was to
insure to riparian owners the right to the tide-waters for all purposes relating to the planting and cultivation of oysters and clams, and an exclusive
right to harvest those crops. . . .""
The court divided into three conflicting factions. The majority upheld
the basic ownership of tidelands in the state, subject to certain special
rights of abutting owners. The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Nichols
favored a literal reading of the 1902 statute as extending the boundary of
abutting owners to take in all tidal waters. He remarks that "[iun 1902
the foreshore area of this State, which includes thousands upon thousands
accompanying notes 99-104. Application of Rule 54(c) is discussed in Sunstrand Corp. v.
Standard Kollsman Industries, Inc., 488 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1973).
14. 236 Ga. 401, 224 S.E.2d 334 (1976).
15. Johnson v. State, 114 Ga. 790, 40 S.E. 807 (1902). See Annot., 52 A.L.R. 1177 (1928).
16. Ga. Laws, 1901, p. 108; GA. CODE ANN. §§85-1307 through 85-1309 (1970).
17. GA. CODE ANN. §2-5402 (Supp. 1975).
18. GA. CODE ANN. §2-601 (1973). The landowners contended that an unconstitutional
statute could not be ratified, even by a constitutional amendment, but the court did not
agree.
19. 236 Ga. at 412, 224 S.E.2d at 341.
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of acres of marshland, was not considered by the majority of Georgians as
having any real value . . . . While, in 1976, it may be incomprehensible
to assume that the General Assembly intended to give to the adjoining
landowners the foreshore of the Georgia coast, yet in 1902 this was not the
case . . . . [T]he effect of the majority opinion is to take private property
without the payment of just and adequate compensation ..
."" The dissenting opinion of Justice Gunter also construed the 1902 Act as extending
the boundaries of landowners to the low-water mark, but Justice Gunter
said it reserved to the public rights of passage, fishing and transportation,
which in effect are the rights asserted by the British Crown at common law.
Those rights, he said, may be exercised by boat, by vehicle, by foot, or by
other appropriate means, except that the right of shellfish growers must
not be disturbed. Every student of property law must read the three opinions and decide for himself whether he agrees or disagrees, but the net
result appears to be one which is advantageous to the people of Georgia as
a whole yet bad for coastal owners and developers.
III.

CHURCH PROPERTY

In Watson v. Jones"' the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the difficulty
of deciding disputes between factions of churchmen, each claiming title to
the church edifice and grounds. A secular court cannot pass upon the
correctness of doctrinal claims advanced on each side, but neither can it
escape the duty of determining the ownership of real property between the
two groups. Much later, the same court reversed the Georgia Supreme
Court in PresbyterianChurch in the U.S. v. EasternHeights Presbyterian
Church" and affirmed the trial court's ruling that the local members held
title free of any denominational control, because the general church had
substantially abandoned its original tenets. Bowing to the reversal, the
Georgia court abandoned any theory of implied trust on behalf of the
general church, and upheld an award in favor of the local trustees, who had
taken title years before by deeds containing no express trust provisions.3
This year, in Carnes v. Smith,2 4 there was an 1852 deed before the court,
made to several named persons "as trustees of the Methodist Episcopal
Church at Mount Pleasant Academy . . . [and] their successors in office." The court recognized that the deeds on their face were materially
indistinguishable from those in the Presbyterian cases. The local congregation voted to withdraw from the general organization and continue as an
20.
21.

Id. at 418-19, 224 S.E.2d at 344.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).

22.
23.

393 U.S. 440 (1969), rev'g 224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690 (1968).
225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041 (1970). The distinction

is tenuous. Why is not a deed to A, B and C, as trustees for a designated church, an express
religious trust?
24. 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322 (1976).
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independent Methodist church, because the denomination refused to furnish a full-time pastor. But it was shown that for many years the congregation had acquiesced in denominational control under the governance of the
bulky Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church. The court
pointed to a Georgia statute, without which deeds to unincorporated
churches would be invalid, providing that title shall vest in the church
"according to the mode of church government or rules of discipline,"2 5 and
another statute under which deeds to church trustees are made "subject
to the authority of the church or religious society for which they hold the
same in trust."" The Presbyterian constitution made no regulations about
local church property except one providing for reversion to the Eldership
if the church became extinct; the Methodist discipline contained an allinclusive set of rules about the acquisition, maintenance and disposition
of churches and parsonages. In Carnes, the long operation of the church
as a connectional member of the United Methodist Church established its
adherence to the religious trust set forth in the discipline. The majority
opinion follows the dictum of an Indiana court that a trust will be implied
unless a local church remains independent of the parent body by maintaining its independence in polity, name and finances."1 The three dissenting
justices regarded the scope of a judicial review in church matters as limited
to construction of the relevant deeds and related documents and would
have refused to imply a trust from the mere existence of a connectional
form of government. The two opinions comprise 13 pages of judicial writing
of a high order.
The right to control church property came up also in Bagley v. Carter.',
Due to the doctrinal differences, 15 members voted for withdrawal of "fellowship" from the other 11 members, but the two factions continued alternate use of the church for services. Matters came to a head when the
unfellowshipped 11 decided to install restrooms. The other 15 members
sought an injunction charging "defacement" of the venerable structure.
They alleged they were in possession of the original church deeds dating
back to 1884 under which the land was conveyed to certain named trustees
and their successors, and that the 11 defendants, having been officially
expelled from membership, had no right to make alterations of any kind
in the church building. The court took the position that "fellowship" is not
the same as "membership;" but even if they were the same, a member
could not be expelled without notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Possession of the original church deeds had no significance unless it could
be shown that the plaintiffs were successors to the trustees named in them.
25.
26.

GA. CODE ANN.
GA. CODE ANN.

§22-5507 (1970).
§22-5508 (1970).

27. United Methodist Church v. St. Louis Crossing Independent Methodist Church, 150
Ind. App. 574, 276 N.E.2d 916, 52 A.L.R.3d 311 (1971).
28. 235 Ga. 624, 220 S.E.2d 919 (1975).
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The dissenting opinion accepted the action of the church as a valid expulsion, stripping the 11 members of all further rights in the church property.
There is an interesting study in church financing in Valley View Church
of God in Christ,Inc. v. King.21 The original church issued bonds to finance
construction, but the bonds contained no provisions for liens upon the real
property, and required merely that the church periodically pay into a
sinking fund enough to redeem the bonds as they matured. There also was
no prohibition against sale of the realty, as there is in some forms of church
bonds.3 0 The original church sold the edifice and the land to another
church, which entered into an agreement for the issuance of new bonds to
the original bondholders in lieu of those issued by the first church. One of
the bondholders refused to turn in his bonds for the new ones and commenced litigation. The court made several rulings: (1) the bonds constituted
unsecured debts, since they were not liens upon the property; (2) the
agreement to issue new bonds was not an implied assumption of the old
ones, and since the plaintiff refused new bonds, he could not hold the
purchaser on the old ones; (3) the plaintiff was entitled to a money judgment against the old church on the theory of anticipatory breach, since
there was default in the maintenance of the sinking fund as required; and
(4) the finding of the trial judge that the sale was not fraudulent, being
3
supported by some evidence, would not be set aside.
IV.

CONVEYANCING

In Olson v. Newsom 32 a title attorney was asked to certify title to property adjacent to his own land, and he did so, with an exception for facts
"as would be disclosed by an accurate survey of the property." He also
advised the purchaser to have a resurvey made after checking out deeds
to all adjoining tracts and to establish the correct boundaries, but the
purchaser decided not to have this done. Later the attorney yielded to
persuasion and struck out the exception as to survey, relying upon the
purchaser's assurances that he would not use the certificate for title insurance or convey the property until the boundaries had been correctly determined. But, after acquiring- title, the purchaser found that the attorney
himself as an adjoining landowner was claiming title to a portion of the
land in his deed, and sued in ejectment. The court brushed aside any
29. 236 Ga. 337, 223 S.E.2d 701 (1976).
30. Most church bonds use the "Negative Pledge," sometimes captioned "Agreement Not
to Encumber or Transfer Property." This generally is held not to constitute an equitable
mortgage or lien, even though it is recorded and is known to subsequent purchasers or lenders.
B. Kuppenheimer & Co., 78 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1935); Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal.2d
311, 38 Cal.Rptr. 505, 392 P.2d 265 (1964); Western States Fin. Co. v. Ruff, 108 Or. 442, 215
P. 501,216 P. 1020 (1923); Knott v. Shepherdstown Mfg. Co., 30 W.Va. 790,5 S.E. 266 (1888).
31. Most bond issues expressly provide for acceleration of maturity. See generally Barnes
v. United Steel Works Corp., 11 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1939), and note in 174 A.L.R. 439, 452 (1948).
32. 236 Ga. 480, 224 S.E.2d 358 (1976).
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protective aid under the survey exception. An attorney passing upon title
to land, said the court, has a higher duty to inform his client of any adverse
claim the attorney may have to the property under examination than
would be required in ordinary business transactions because of the confidential attorney-client relationship. In the exercise of due diligence in his
profession the attorney must determine whether the description in the
deed prepared by him includes any of his own property. 3
V.

DEEDS

Violations of deed restrictions often go unhindered because the interested parties are not able to work up legal opposition in time to avoid
laches and estoppel. It is settled that an interlocutory injunction against
violation of restrictive covenants will be denied where the plaintiff is
deemed guilty of unreasonable delay in bringing legal proceedings and
large construction costs are incurred by the defendant in the meantime. 3'
And mere protests or threats of suit do not exclude the consequences of
laches or acquiescence. 35 But where the case goes to a jury after the grant
of a temporary injunction, the question of laches becomes an issue of fact
for their determination. In Bacon v. Edwards3 that is what happened. It
was shown that the plaintiffs, adjoining landowners, had protested to the
defendant then had spent the next six months contacting real estate
agents, city officials and four lawyers while the construction went on. The
court ruled that the jury was authorized to find that the plaintiffs were not
at fault in failing to sue more promptly, and it upheld a drastic permanent
injunction requiring complete removal or demolition of a completed dwelling because of its insufficient size. The case should serve to shake the
complacency of builders who rely too strongly on the laches doctrine and
doggedly continue construction known to violate deed covenants.,
Where, for reasons of his own, a landowner wishes to divest himself of
title to land and records a deed naming a grantee who doesn't know about
the deed, who owns the land? That appeared to be the situation in Barrett
v. Simmons,3 8 but, worse still, the deed recited that an outstanding mortgage was assumed by the grantee. Later the person named as grantee gave
33. See Owen v. Neely, 471 S.W.2d 705, 59 A.L.R.3d 1171 (Ky. 1971).
34. Burton v. East Point Motors, Inc., 209 Ga. 872, 76 S.E.2d 700 (1953).
35. Springtime, Inc. v. Douglas County, 228 Ga. 753, 187 S.E.2d 874 (1972). But the
absence of protest or voicing of objection may form a basis for laches. Davies v. Curry, 230
Ga. 190, 196 S.E.2d 383 (1973).
36. 234 Ga. 100, 214 S.E.2d 539 (1975).
37. Before the 1966 Civil Practice Act was enacted, the denial of a temporary injunction
would terminate a case for all practical purposes, because mandatory injunctions were prohibited. When construction had been completed, the case would be dismissed as moot. Blackwell v. Farrar, 209 Ga. 420, 73 S.E.2d 203 (1952). The CPA repealed GA. CODE ANN. §55-110
(1974), which prohibited mandatory injunctions.
38. 235 Ga. 600, 221 S.E.2d 25 (1975).
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a named corporation a quitclaim deed with a recital that the prior deed
was made without his knowledge and that he had made no such assumption. The original landowner then sued to cancel both deeds and alleged
that the first deed was entirely without consideration and had never been
delivered. Lack of consideration, said the court, is not a ground for cancellation, but non-delivery stands upon a different footing. Yet a deed need
not be personally received by the grantee; it may be received by another
on his behalf, and acceptance may be ratified by the conduct of the grantee. Here the court regarded the evidence as raising an issue of fact, since
the grantee had executed a quitclaim deed but expressly disclaimed delivery, and the verdict and judgment in favor of delivery was therefore affirmed. A caveat should be noted here: A quitclaim deed, while effective
to convey any title of the maker, is not generally regarded as an assertion
of title, but rather is regarded as a disclaimer. 9 Apparently the difference
here is that it named as grantee, not the original grantor, but a third party
corporation, thus purporting to pass title to a new owner.
Survivorship deeds have received new encouragement in Georgia by a
1976 statute0 amending Georgia Code §85-1001 by adding express recognition of such deeds, permitting them to create joint estates even though the
grantor may also be one of the grantees, and providing that a reference to
the grantees as "joint tenants" or as "joint tenants with survivorship" will
suffice for that purpose. The statute should put to rest the ancient taboo
against a grantor conveying to himself, as where a landowner vested with
the whole title makes a deed to himself and his wife as joint tenants. A
few benighted appellate courts have held such deeds invalid.,,
VI.

EASEMENTS

Where a subdivider laid out five lots on a plat, all fronting on Ridge
Road, and three of them ran back to a 20-foot strip of land leading from a
fourth lot, marked "reserved," a legal dispute arose culminating in Miller
v. Wells."2 The supreme court was asked to decide whether the strip in
question remained the property of the subdivider or was impliedly dedicated as a means of access for the various lot owners. The opinion rejected
both claims. The court viewed the mere designation of the strip as "reserved" as insufficient to establish a complete retention of title without the
further addition of the words "for access" or "for alley," which would showan intent to dedicate the strip for such purposes. Marking the strip as
"reserved" without more, the court concluded, created an ambiguity to be
39. Harper v. Paradise, 233 Ga. 194, 210 S.E.2d 710 (1974).
40. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 521. The act also deals with joint bank deposits.
41. See Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Ill. 437, 163 N.E. 327, 62 A.L.R. 511 (1928); cf. Davis
v. Davis, 223 S.C. 182, 75 S.E.2d 46 (1953) and Woolard v. Smith, 244 N.C. 489, 94 S.E.2d
466 (1956).
42. 235 Ga. 411, 219 S.E.2d 751 (1975).
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explained by parol evidence. The adverse finding of the trial judge on
conflicting testimony had to be affirmed, except to the extent that it attempted to change the status quo in an interlocutory hearing. There is no
dissenting opinion, but I find it difficult to accept any ruling that the word
"reserved" is subject to any inherent ambiguity. Current lexicons define
it as meaning "to keep as one's own; retain." A reservation in a deed is a
provision whereby the grantor detaches and retains for himself some interest in the land granted. An exception may be made in favor of other
parties, but a reservation is always in favor of the grantor. 3 If such an
attempt to reserve a strip of land is considered ambiguous, we must relegate the construction of deeds to the jury, swayed by conflicting testimony
as to what was intended.
4
There are two new cases growing out of Berolzheimer v. Taylor.1
Under
Code §85-1404, a parol license is converted into an easement if the licensee
has executed it and has incurred expense in doing so. In Berolzheimer the
section was contrued as operating only where there is an express oral license, excluding one that is implied or that arises non-verbally. In Jordan
5
v. Coalson,1
the court found ample evidence that there was an oral license,
that the licensees purchased adjoining land in reliance upon it, that they
expended money and labor in improving the road laid out under the license
granted, and that they thus were entitled to enforce the license as an
easement. City of Warrenton v. Johnson," on the other hand, represents a
further extension of the ruling made in Berolzheimer v. Taylor. With the
oral permission of the county commissioner, the city government built a
police booth costing $1,300 on the corner of the courthouse square, but the
court ruled that the permission was not binding upon the county because
it was not entered on its minutes' 7 Since it was not a valid license, it could
not ripen into an easement.
In Olsen v. Noble 8 a claim of prescriptive easement was denied on the
principle that a tenant cannot originate such an easement in favor of his
landlord by unauthorized use of an adjoining driveway. The case is distinguished in Swygert v. Roberts.'9 There the dominant tract was rented to a
tenant for farming purposes, and the road in question was its only means
of access, so authority for its use must have been implied by the lease itself.
In Walker v. Duncan," a developer had sold off building lots in accord43. Dawson v. Western Maryland R. Co., 107 Md. 70, 68 A. 301 (1907).
44. 230 Ga. 595, 198 S.E.2d 301 (1973).
45. 235 Ga. 326, 219 S.E.2d 439 (1975). Accord: Ferguson v. Spencer, 127 Ind. 66, 25 N.E.
1035 (1890). The rule is not followed in some states. See, e.g., Yeager v. Tuning, 79 Ohio St.
121, 86 N.E. 6571 (1908).
46. 235 Ga. 665, 221 S.E.2d 429 (1975).
47. The court relied on GA. CODE ANN. §23-1701 (1971).
48. 209 Ga. 899, 76 S.E.2d 775 (1953).
49. 136 Ga. App. 700, 222 S.E.2d 75 (1975).
50. 236 Ga. 331, 223 S.E.2d 675 (1976).
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ance with a subdivision plat showing them fronting on streets leading to a
lake designated as "Tommy Walker Memorial Park." This, said the court,
constituted an implied undertaking to preserve the lake area as a park, and
the court upheld an injunction against construction of a clubhouse and a
series of condominiums around the lake that would deprive the lot-owners
of their rights of access to and enjoyment of the lake.
Scenic easements have been much used in other states. A typical example is an instrument granting negative easements to the state for the protection of highways from billboards, junkyards and other scenic blemishes. 5' Georgia now has a statute recognizing the validity of conservation
and historical-preservation easements when acquired by any governmental
body, trust or organization empowered to acquire land. The easements are
enforceable as easements in gross and are extinguishable like other easements. Tax assessors are required to revalue the property accordingly. 2

VII.

EMINENT DOMAIN

Does the power of eminent domain include the power to take more land,
or a greater interest in land, than is currently needed? Excess condemnation generally is permitted where the part not used would be a worthless
remnant or where at the time of taking the exact amount of land necessary
is difficult to determine and the subsequent taking of additional land
would require much higher compensation. Georgia statutes formerly prohibited the taking of a fee where a lesser interest would suffice and provided for a reversion to the owner upon abandonment." But the expense
of constructing modern highways is so great that the use of reversionable
lands would be highly uneconomical. So Georgia statutes like those of
most other states,54 have been amended to authorize the taking of feesimple, indefeasible title for highways and other projects. The constitutionality of these statutes has gone unchallenged in a series of decisions,
the last of which is Sadtler v. City of Atlanta,51 where a reversion of land
acquired by the City of Atlanta for the construction of 1-485 was claimed
51. A number of states for years have had legislation authorizing highway departments
or local governments to condemn scenic easements along a specified width of land surrounding a public highway to protect an unspoiled natural landscape or to beautify the locale by
new plantings. See Kamrowski v. State, 31 Wis.2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966); Wes Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. Goldberg, 55 N.J. 347, 262 A.2d 199 (1970).
52. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 1181. The admonition to the tax assessor probably does no more
than declare existing law, since restricting the front 300 feet of a tract will automatically
render it worthless for most commercial use. Richmond County v. Gardner, 135 Ga. App. 939,
218 S.E.2d 609 (1975)(zoning restrictions).
53. City of Atlanta v. Fulton County, 210 Ga. 784, 82 S.E.2d 850 (1954).
54. Excess condemnation has long been sanctioned in highway construction, for example,
in the taking of widths far greater than presently needed. See, e.g., Dickson v. St. Lucie
County, 67 So.2d 662 (Fla. 1953).
55. 236 Ga. 396, 223 S.E.2d 819 (1976).
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by the former owners when the entire project was abandoned in 1974. This
apparently means that the city may use the property as it sees
fit-including conversion to parks or resale to private enterprise.
VIII.

LANDLORD AND TENANT

In Hathaway v. Gorfine,6 a landlord sued the tenant for the rent of the
entire future term of the lease, plus attorneys' fees. As often happens
nowadays, the tenant counterclaimed for damages, and his recovery of a
$16,000 verdict was upheld by the appellate court. The court relied on
evidence that the landlord had failed to perform his covenants: the building was not completed, there was no parking lot, landscaping was
unfinished, and the shopping center was poorly lighted. The tenant, on the
other hand, had spent large sums for his own improvements and had made
a large security deposit. Where both parties are in default, it becomes a
question of counterpoise whether breach on one side will excuse a breach
on the other; 57 the law inclines toward regarding the covenant of the landlord as independent of those of the tenant, except for preliminary constructions essential to occupancy, as in the present case. The relative time set
for performance must be considered, as must the question whether a
breach is remediable in damages. Here the landlord may have been financially unable to complete construction because of rent defaults, but the
tenant may have been unable to pay rent because the premises were not
in condition for the operation of his business; this last factor outweighed
the other.
Implied covenants are imported more readily into leases than into conveyances. For example, a covenant of the landlord for quiet enjoyment is
always implied. 5 There are also exceptional situations where a covenant
of the tenant to continue operation of the particular business may be
implied." But in the recent case of Kroger Co. v. Bonny Corp.,0 the majority of the court, with two dissents, construed a shopping center lease for a
supermarket and refused to apply the theory of implied covenant on several grounds:
(1) The assignability of the lease weighs against any implied
undertaking by the tenant to continue operations as planned
56. 134 Ga. App. 748, 216 S.E.2d 338 (1975).
57. See GA. CODE ANN. §§85-905, 85-902 (1970); Lewis & Co. v. Chisolm, 68 Ga. 40 (1881);
Clark v. Sapp, 47 Ga. App. 91, 169 S.E. 692 (1933).
58. Adair v. Allen, 18 Ga. App. 636, 89 S.E. 1099 (1916). See Annot., 62 A.L.R. 1257
(1929).
59. In a typical gasoline service station lease, where the rent is a percentage of the gross
receipts, an obligation to continue operation of the station has been implied. Sinclair Ref.
Co. v. Davis, 47 Ga. App. 601, 171 S.E. 150 (1933); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Giddens, 54 Ga. App.
69, 187 S.E. 201 (1936). See Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 971 (1971).
60. 134 Ga. App. 834, 216 S.E.2d 341 (1975).
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(2) The lease contained language strongly indicating complete
freedom of use so long as it was lawful, rather than restricting the
tenant to the conduct of a specified business.
(3) It expressly prohibited the landlord from placing competitive grocery stores in the shopping center without imposing any
correlative duty upon the tenant.
(4) Similarly, the lease permitted the tenant to cancel if the
landlord failed to lease a required amount of space to other shopping center tenants but omitted any corresponding obligation of
the tenant to keep his space occupied.
(5) Contemporaneous leases of all small tenants contained
express covenants not to vacate or abandon the premises, while
that of Kroger and the other large occupants did not.
(6) The stipulated monthly rent was $2,253 plus 1% of annual
sales in excess of $2,704,000. The monthly rent of $2,253 was admitted to be a fair-market-value return at the beginning date of
the lease."I
2
Southland Investment Corp. v. McIntosh"
was a suit for rent brought
by the lessor against the original 21-year lessee after an assignment by the
latter that was consented to by the lessor. The cogent opinion deals with
several defenses ably presented by the lessee's counsel; it goes deeply into
the effect of assignment, both under general law and under the special
provisions of the Georgia Code, and is recommended reading for all realproperty attorneys. It discusses several points of great interest:

(1) While an assignment will not generally release the original
lessee, the transaction may constitute a novation, if the lessor by
consenting to the transfer in effect substitutes the new tenant as
his own.63
(2) In case of the Georgia rental contract known as a usufruct,
which is non-transferable, an election by the landlord to proceed
against the new tenant releases the old, unless the lease makes the
old tenant a surety by providing for his continued liability. The
same is not true of an estate for years, unless a novation has occurred.
(3) Contract provisions for continued liability of the lessee
after assignment may be construed as creating a suretyship with
automatic release where the lessor acts in a way that increases the
risk. But the court rejected the argument that the lessor's accept61. This is a pivotal fact in most cases. Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 971 (1971).
62. 137 Ga. App. 216, 223 S.E.2d 257 (1976).
63. See Norge Sales Corp. v. Baker, 111 Ga. App. 373, 141 S.E.2d 786 (1965); G.W. Collier
Estate v. Murray, 145 Ga. 851, 90 S.E. 52 (1916); 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant §500, nn.58,
59 (1968); Lazerus v. Shapiro, 211 Iowa 376, 233 N.W. 723 (1930).

19761

REAL PROPERTY

ance of a financially irresponsible new tenant-transferee is such an
act, since it is the act of the lessee which brings in the new tenant.
(4) Provisions regulating the mechanics of transfer may be construed as governing not only the first transfer but also subsequent
transfers.
The effect of the tenant's bankruptcy was dealt with in Vineyard
Village-Georgia, Inc. v. Crum." Three days before adjudication of bankruptcy, after the tenant had defaulted in rent payments, the landlord had
formally terminated the lease and repossessed the premises. The court
decided that the landlord was not subject to a general stay order of the
bankruptcy court prohibiting all interference with the tenant's property or
any premises occupied by it. The termination amounted to a complete
rescission, discharging all future liability for rent and cutting off all rights
of the tenant in the premises. But if the tenant had remained in possession
after default and notice of termination, the result would have been otherwise.
Carvel Corp. v. Rabeyf5 elaborately applies the rules governing lease
assignments. Confronted with a voluminous commercial lease, the court's
task was to determine which party was liable for not performing the covenants of the original lessee, including payment of rent:
(1) The original tenant was not liable; it had assigned the lease
to a newly created corporation. The lease permitted this and also
provided that such an assignment relieved the lessee of further
liability.
(2) Another corporation took temporary possession of the
leased premises with the consent of the new lessee, operated a
business there and paid rent to the lessor. Such an occupant does
not thereby assume any obligations under the lease and cannot be
held to future liability for breach of its covenants."
(3) The assignee of the lease ordinarily would be liable for rent
and other obligations, but here the lessor had refused to accept
payments of rent from the assignee and had contended that there
was, under the lease, an automatic reassignment back to the original lessee because of a default of the assignee. The difficulty with
this contention was that the legal assignee was not in default; its
efforts to pay rent had been rejected by the lessor, and the temporary occupant never became a party to the lease. So its failure to
continue payments did not constitute a default.
64.
65.
66.

136 Ga. App. 335, 221 S.E.2d 208 (1975).
135 Ga. App. 856, 219 S.E.2d 475 (1975).
Accord, Bell v. American Protective League, 163 Mass. 558, 40 N.E. 857 (1895).
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The 1976 Landlord and Tenant Act 7 appears to have come from the pen
of a skilled poverty lawyer and bears a marked resemblance to Truth-inLending 6 and RESPA15 Dealing only with multi-residential leases, it prohibits certain waivers by the tenant, such as waiver of the landlord's duty
to repair and of the duty to maintain the tenants' security deposits as a
trust fund. It invalidates any stipulation for recovery of attorney's fees by
the landlord unless a similar provision is also made for those of the tenant.
It requires the landlord to disclose in writing to the tenant at or before the
beginning of the term the name and address of the record owner of the
premises or of some person authorized to act on his behalf and to accept
service of process for him as well as the name of the person authorized to
manage the premises. Changes of ownership or agents must be disclosed
to the tenant in writing or by posting a notice within 30 days. Revisions
are also made in the procedure for dispossessory proceedings and distraints. Exemptions are provided for smaller landlords. 0
IX.

MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS

Time limits on foreclosure for the enforcement of liens came up for
consideration in several recent cases. The Georgia act requires that an
action for that purpose be filed within one year after the debt is due.7'
Bankruptcy of the contractor excuses suit against him, but the effect of the
lien claimant's bankruptcy was a new question in view of the federal statute granting receivers and trustees a two-year extension of all "statutes of
limitation."72 Lee v. Stokes 3 adopts the position that the Georgia one-year
statute is not extended by the federal statute; it is not a mere statute of
limitation but a condition precedent to the formation of a substantive
right. The case is said to be one of first impression throughout the United
States, with the exception of a California opinion taking the contrary
view," which the court distinguishes by comparison of the language used.
75
Whitley Construction Co. v. Carlyle Real Estate Limited-72 Partnership
67. GA. CODE ANN. §61-102 et. seq. (Supp. 1976). There is also an act at Ga. Laws, 1976,
p. 1511, dealing with dispossessory and distraint proceedings.
68. 82 Stat. 146 (1968), 15 U.S.C.A. §1601 et seq. (1974).
69. The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 88 Stat. 1724 (1974).
70. GA. CODE ANN. §67-401 (Supp. 1976).
71. GA. CODE ANN. §67-2002(3) (Supp. 1976).
72. Under §11(e) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. §29(e): "A receiver or trustee may,
within two years subsequent to the date of adjudication or within such further period of time
as the Federal or State law may permit, institute proceedings in behalf of the estate upon
any claim against which the period of limitation fixed by Federal or State law had not expired
at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy."
73. 135 Ga. App. 642, 218 S.E.2d 654 (1975).
74. Robinson v. S. & S. Dev., 256 Cal. App.2d 13, 63 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1967); followed,
Petersen v. W.T. Grant Co., 41 Cal. App.3d 217, 115 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1974).
75. 137 Ga. App. 113, 222 S.E.2d 895 (1976).
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adopts a surprising but plausible interpretation of a 1968 amendment to
the same Georgia statute."' As amended, the act is said to impose a oneyear limit on the filing of a suit against an owner even though judgment
must first be obtained against the contractor. The ruling may well place a
lien-claimant in an almost impossible predicament. If the contractor resides in one county and the landowner in another, lien-claimant cannot file
a joint suit; he first must sue the contractor in his own county, and that
suit may pend throughout the one-year period or longer. The statute urgently needs revision.
Allied Asphalt Co. v. Cumbie77 holds that the one-year limitation is met
by filing a joint suit against the contractor and the owner, even7 8though the
complaint fails to demand a judgment against the contractor.
Two other decisions have smoothed the way for lien-claimants.
Bankston v. Smith,71 reversing the court of appeals, adopts the established
general rule that proof of delivery to the building site will make out a case,
and the onus then passes to the landowner to prove that the material was
not used for improvement of the realty." Houston General Insurance Co.
v. Stein Steel & Supply Co.' deals with the statute permitting the owner
or contractor to file a dissolution bond to dissolve a claim of lien. Such a
bond makes the judgment against the principal conclusive upon the surrendered without notice to the surety or an opportunity to
ety, even when
2
be heard.1
Disbursement of loan proceeds during construction to meet payrolls and
bills has often been considered in the light of distribution of trust funds.
Some states have so earmarked them by statute, and that has led to
repercussions in bankruptcy and receivership proceedings. 3 New legisla76. Ga. Laws, 1968, p. 317; Ga. Code Ann. §67-2002(3) (Supp. 1976).
77. 134 Ga. App. 960, 216 S.E.2d 659 (1975).
78. Under the 1966 Civil Practice Act and analogous federal rules, the failure of the
complaint to demand any particular form of relief is not prejudicial. GA. CODE ANN. §81A154(c) (1972).
79. 236 Ga. 92, 222 S.E.2d 375 (1976), rev'g 134 Ga. App. 882, 216 S.E.2d 634 (1975).
80. 57 C.J.S. Mechanics Liens §308 (1948); 53 Am. Jur.2d Mechanics Liens §403 (1970).
81. 134 Ga. App. 624, 215 S.E.2d 511 (1975).
82. The rule rests upon precedents dealing with bonds filed in judicial proceedings. The
dissolution bond provided for in GA. CODE ANN. §67-2004 (Supp. 1975) is filed with the clerk
of the court in response to a claim of lien, but at that time there is no proceeding pending
and the bond is simply a private contract subject to litigation over its validity and construction. Under this view, due process would require more than the court here approves. Deland
v. Wagner, 64 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1933), appears to agree with the Georgia court, but there a
foreclosure proceeding had already been filed when the dissolution bond was posted.
83. Courts generally have taken the view that a construction-loan mortgagee owes no duty
to junior lienholders to see that the money advanced by him is applied to the improvement
of the property. Cf. Tripp v. Babcock, 195 Mass. 1, 80 N.E. 593 (1907). But in Church E.
Gates & Co. v. B.N. Builders, Inc., 263 N.Y.S. 613 (1933), the court cites a New York statute,
Lien Law §13(3)(2) requiring that the mortgage contain a covenant that the borrower receives
all advances as a trust fund first to defray the costs of the improvement; the court holds that
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tion in Georgia may have the same effect. Under a 1976 statute,84 any
contractor or other person who uses funds paid to him for real property
improvements, leaving unpaid amounts owing by him for labor, services
or materials, is guilty of "theft by conversion of payments for property
improvements" punishable as a felony.
X.

MORTGAGES

Under a 1941 Georgia statute,85 a mortgage or security deed becomes
unenforceable after 20 years unless it is preserved in the manner provided,
and title to the land automatically reverts to the maker of the deed. In
Newman v. Newman, 8 the grantee-mortgagee contended that the 20-year
period did not run against him during the time he was serving in the U.S.
armed services; he based his contention on the federal Soldiers and Sailors
Act, which tolls statutes of limitation during terms of service. 7 The supreme court ruled otherwise, with three dissents. Since the Georgia statute
provided not only for a bar of the foreclosure proceeding but also for a
reversion of title, the court decided, it is not a mere statute of limitation,
so the federal act does not apply. The dissenting justices took the view that
the Georgia act is essentially a statute of limitation within the meaning of
the federal statute, and the addition of a reverter clause should not be
allowed to defeat the beneficent purpose of protecting soldiers and sailors
from the harassment of litigation while serving their country.
Although an absolute deed accompanied by the grantor's retention of
possession may be shown by parol evidence to be a mere mortgage, it has
long been held in Georgia that the mere execution of an option for the
grantor to repurchase will not convert the transaction into a mortgage.
Yet, in such a case, the fact that the grantor remains in possession will
raise serious questions of fact even against subsequent purchasers who rely
89
upon the recorded warranty deed. Whitehead v. Joiner
was a case of this
type. There was an absolute deed accompanied by an option to repurchase
by making annual installment payments over a ten-year period; the granwhere funds were applied to the purchase of other property by the borrower with the lender's
knowledge, priority of the mortgage was lost to construction liens. See Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d
179 (1961).
84. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 1456; GA. CODE ANN. §26-1808.1 (Supp. 1976).
85. GA. CODE ANN. §67-1308 et seq. (1967).
86. 234 Ga. 297, 216 S.E.2d 79 (1975).
87. 50 U.S.C.A. (War and Nat'l Def. App.) §525 (1968).
88. The test is whether the relation of debtor and creditor remains. Hobbs v. Houston,
195 Ga. 571, 24 S.E.2d 884 (1943). See also Felton v. Grier, 109 Ga. 320, 35 S.E. 175 (1900);
Conway v. Alexander, 11 U.S. 218, 3 L.Ed. 321 (1812).
89. 234 Ga. 457, 216 S.E.2d 317 (1975). See also Perimeter Dev. Corp. v. Haynes, 234 Ga.
437, 216 S.E.2d 581 (1975), which grew out of an absolute deed claimed to be a mortgage;
the case is discussed here under "possession as Notice" in the text accompanying notes 108109.
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tor contended this option was in essence a mortgage and not a sale. The
court upheld a verdict and judgment for the grantee. Since there was no
contention of usury, the grantor was in default in complying with the
repurchase option as such or in repaying the mortgage debt if the transaction were deemed a mortgage.
Usury laws generally do not apply to purchase-money obligations due to
the vendor, and the stringent penalties imposed upon second-mortgage
residential loans in Georgia" have been ruled inapplicable to such obligations, since they are not "loans" within the contemplation of the statute.'
But in Nash v. Mid-State Homes, Inc.,9" the court reversed a summary
judgment for the vendor-mortgagee. It said a jury issue remained whether
the secured note represented an unpaid balance of the sale price with
interest added or merely an agreed "time-price." If the agreed sale price
was less than the amount of the note and the difference was interest, then,
said the court, usury laws will apply. On the other hand, if the full amount
of the note was also the full purchase price or the full price with legal
interest, there is no usury. It seems that again we have another one of those
questions too difficult for anyone but a jury to answer.
A release clause in a security deed came before the court for interpreta3
tion in Honea v. Gilbert.1
The sales contract and the security deed provided that (1) "seller shall release in its entirety the above Tract No. 2,
containing 20 acres upon payment in full of the existing first mortgage,"
and (2) "additional releases based on 110% of money paid in with interior
and road frontage proportionate." The seller-mortgagee gave a release of
the 20-acre tract when the existing first mortgage was paid by the
purchaser-mortgagor. But he also claimed the right to an additional release
under the second paragraph on the basis of the total amount paid, including the initial payment made at the closing of the sale and subsequent
payments of interest. The court did not agree. "Money paid" meant only
payments on the secured debt and did not include the down payment. So
when the mortgagor refused to make the required payment until he was
furnished with the lease demanded, he became in default, and the mortga4
gee was entitled to accelerate the entire indebtedness and foreclose.
The money-lenders of today, like the landlords, have become favorite
targets of damage suits brought by consumer-oriented barristers. A Cali90. GA. CODE ANN. §47-201 et seq. (1971).
91. Poteat v. Butler, 231 Ga. 187, 200 S.E.2d 741 (1973).
92. 234 Ga. 314, 215 S.E.2d 686 (1975). See Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065, 1121, § 10 (1967).
93. 236 Ga. 218, 223 S.E.2d 115 (1976).
94. Another facet of the case not mentioned by the court would be whether, assuming he
were entitled to a release, he could demand that it be given him simultaneously or prior to
his payment of the required installments. The general rule is that a mortgagee is not required
to execute a partial release under the provisions of a mortgage until a demand is made and
all pre-conditions are met. Clason's Point Land Co. v. Schwartz, 237 App. Div. 741, 262
N.Y.S. 756 (1933); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §479 (1949); and Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 7 (1972).
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fornia court held a lender liable for construction defects overlooked in its
inspection reports." Other courts have refused to go this far," but Georgia
has made some headway in that direction. And in Gilbert v. Cherry," the
foreclosing mortgagee was greeted by a fusilade of accusations:
(1) Failure to pay off other debts, as agreed, out of the proceeds
of the loan.
(2) Taking transfers of these debts and foreclosing on other
property of the mortgagor securing them.
(3) Charging usurious interest on the loan.
(4) Foreclosing without giving notice of acceleration.
(5) Encouraging the mortgagor to make extensive improvements on the property while secretly anticipating foreclosure, and
later, without telling him foreclosure had already occurred.
The court upheld a jury verdict for $16,200 actual and $5,000 punitive
damages. The mortgagee's failure to discharge other debts excused the
mortgagor's failure to meet agreed loan payments, and no tender of any
amount was required. Because the mortgagee had bid in the property at
the wrongful foreclosure and resold it to an innocent third party, the mortgagee could sue for fraud and deceit in lieu of claiming the invalidity of
the foreclosure.
XI.

PARTITION PROCEEDINGS

The distinctions that are stubbornly maintained between legal and equitable partition are an unjustifiable anachronism in our legal system. Georgia abolished the distinctions between law and equity years ago by statute," but the courts have clung to the old rules about inadequacy of the
legal remedy and so forth.'" The 1966 Civil Practice Act as adopted in
Georgia will not permit an action to be dismissed merely because it asks
for equitable relief which cannot be granted,'"' and the new regime was
honored in Sikes v. Sikes.0 2 But in Burnham v. Lynn, 0 the court sustained
95. Connor v. Great Western Say. & L. Ass'n, 69 Cal.2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr 369, 447 P.2d
609 (1968).
96. See Callaizakis v. Astor Dev. Co., 4 Ill. App.3d 163, 280 N.E.2d 512 (1972); Bradler
v. Craig, 79 Cal. Rptr 401 (1969).
97. See Langley v. Stone, 112 Ga. App. 237, 144 S.E. 627 (1965).
98. 136 Ga. App. 417, 221 S.E.2d 472 (1975).
99. GA. CODE ANN. §37-901 (1962); Miller v. Jennings, 168 Ga. 101, 147 S.E. 32 (1929);
Smith v. Hancock, 163 Ga. 222, 136 S.E. 52 (1926).
100. It remains true in Georgia as in other jurisdictions that "the forms of action we have
buried, but they still rule us from their graves." F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT
COMMON LAW 250 (1909).
101. GA. CODE ANN. §81A-154(c) (1972).
102. 233 Ga. 97, 209 S.E.2d 641 (1974).
103. 235 Ga. 207, 219 S.E.2d 111 (1975).
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a defense that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law by statutory
partition under Code §85-1504 et seq. and was therefore not entitled to a
decree of equitable partition. Even though the action cannot be dismissed
for failure to allege the inadequacy of the legal remedy, said the court, the
plaintiff is nonetheless bound to prove that the remedy at law is insufficient as a part of his case or that peculiar circumstances render equitable
proceedings more suitable and just. The opinion leaves a hazy subject
much hazier-a problem that should be met by clarifying legislation if
constitutionally possible. It may be feasible to incorporate into the procedure for partition at law many of the desirable features of equitable partition, so that the intervention of equity will become unnecessary. A look at
the present statute,"" which dates back to 1767, reveals a deplorably loose
procedure in which the defendants are not served but receive only a 20day-advance written notice from the plaintiff's attorney. Section 85-1509
provides for hearing defenses only after the practitioners have been appointed and sworn in and have made their return dividing the property-even though serious questions of title may be and often are involved.
Section 85-1511 permits the court to deny partition and to order a sale
without requiring any new notice to interested parties, who may be quietly
assuming that the court will divide the property and award them a share.
But the same section fails to authorize a private sale, even though one is
consented to by all parties. Section 85-1512 makes the proceeds of sale
payable by the purchaser to the unbonded commissioners rather than into
the registry of the court. The crowning ineptitude, however, is in §85-1515,
which destroys the marketability of each parcel awarded to a cotenant by
allowing persons under a disability to attack the judgment within one year
after their disabilities end. A strong argument could be made that the
present Georgia statute for legal partition is always an inadequate remedy.
XII.

POSSESSION AS NOTICE

We are so accustomed to a recording system in which every document
affecting the title must be filed for record that it may come as a shock to
find that the law permits a claimant to keep his evidence of title in his
pocket or his desk without spreading it on the public records and thus to
mislead purchasers or lenders who advance money to the previous owner
without being aware of his claims. True, there are two conditions: (1) he
must be in possession of the property at the time, and (2) he must disclose
his claims if inquiry is made of him. The result of the rule is that no
purchaser or lender may safely deal with realty without both an inspection
of the premises and interviews with all persons occupying them; and a title
attorney should always certify title "subject to rights of persons in possession" to warn his client of this hazard and to protect himself from a charge
104.

GA. CODE ANN. §85-1506 et seq. (1970).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

of negligence. In Yancey v. Harris,5' a borrower with apparently good
record title told the prospective lender that his mother-in-law was occupying the property as his tenant without rent. The lender went to the house,
visited with the mother-in-law without telling her of the proposed loan,
and she said nothing to him of any claim of title on her part. After the loan
was closed and went into default, the mother-in-law sought to restrain the
foreclosure and claimed to be the beneficial owner under a secret trust; she
said she and her husband had put the title in the name of the son-in-law
because of his good income and credit rating for the original purchasemoney loan. The majority of the court, reversing the trial court's direction
of a verdict in favor of the lender, held that, because the mother-in-law
was in exclusive possession, the lender had to inquire under what right she
occupied the property and was charged with notice of whatever she would
have disclosed. Two justices dissented; they said her conduct in putting
title in another name and maintaining secrecy during the loan negotiations
raised an estoppel. Although the opinion was a mere reversal of the direction of a verdict and may be regarded as requiring merely that the issue
be submitted to a jury, it does not so state. One of the dissenting justices
regarded it as laying down a new mandate to prospective purchasers and
lenders: "The lender must now go upon the land to be encumbered to
ascertain if any third party is in possession, even a member of the
borrower's family.""' And the dissent concludes with regret over "the effect it will have on the real estate practice in this state." The rule does
present immense practical difficulties in many cases. The purchaser of a
large office building, an apartment complex or a shopping center will find
it almost impossible within a limited time to interview every occupant and
generally must content himself with a review of the vendor's lease files and
an affidavit of the vendor or his rental agent. The rule is by no means
peculiar to Georgia, but other courts have made numerous exceptions.107
105. 234 Ga. 320, 216 S.E.2d 83 (1975).
106. Id. at 330, 216 S.E.2d at 88.
107. The rule prevails throughout Anglo-Saxon law except where modified by statute.
See, e.g., George v. Kent, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 16 (1863); Pringle v. Dunn, 37 Wis. 449, 10 Am.
Rep. 772 (1875); Hodges' Ex'rs v. Amerman, 40 N.J.Eq. 99, 2 A. 257 (1885). Judicial exceptions have been made in the case of a grantor remaining in possession after the recording of
his deed, Koon v. Tramel, 71 Iowa 132, 32 N.W. 243 (1887); retention of part only, Morgan
v. McCuin, 96 Ark. 512, 132 S.W. 459 (1910); and occupancy by members of the record
owner's family, Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 540, 98 S.W.2d 346, 109 A.L.R. 739 (1936). Statutory changes of the rule may also be found. A model statute in L. SIMES & C. TAYLOR,
IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION 30 (1960) provides that a record conveyance is
prima facie evidence "that the grantee in such an instrument had no notice of any infirmities
in the title of the grantor, other than such notice as he derived from the record." There was
also a 1922 statute in South Carolina (S.C. Civ. Code §5313 providing that "no possession of
real property described in any instrument of writing required by law to be recorded shall
operate as notice of such instrument, and actual notice shall be deemed and held sufficient
to supply the place of registration only when such notice is of the instrument itself or of its
nature and purport." See Van Ness v. Schachte, 143 S.C. 429, 141 S.E. 721 (1928).
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In Perimeter Development Corp. v. Haynes,"8 the majority opinion relied upon the ruling in Yancey v. Harris that notice by possession is not
defeated by estoppel. A purchaser and a lender were made defendants in
an action claiming a recorded, absolute deed accompanied by a rental
agreement and a repurchase option was intended as a mortgage only. The
supreme court denied them the status of innocent third persons because
of their failure to inquire of the plaintiff in possession before dealing with
the apparent record owner. The court quoted from Pomeroy: "[T]he party
who claims the benefit of an estoppel must not only have been free from
fraud in the transaction but must have acted in good faith and reasonable
diligence; otherwise no equity will arise in his favor."''0

XIII.

REAL ESTATE BROKERS

A broker employed by a vendor to obtain a purchaser is not liable in
damages to the purchaser because the broker may have violated the numerous standards of "unfair practices" prescribed in the Code as a basis
for revocation or suspension of licenses by the Georgia Real Estate Commission."0 That, at least, is the position of the court in Campagna v. Sara
Hudson Realty Co. ,'Liability on the part of the broker would be analogous
(in the court's view) to a losing defendant suing the plaintiff's attorney
because of the latter's unethical conduct causing him to lose the case.
XIV.

REAL ESTATE SALES CONTRACTS

There has been much difficulty in the books about financing clauses in
sales contracts. But the Georgia cases appear to have finally concluded
that the contract may be valid even though it is contingent on the availability to the purchaser of a mortgage loan-if the subject matter, terms,
interest and time are set out with sufficient specificity." 2 Furthermore,
even though the writing fails to meet the standards thus set, actual satisfaction of the conditions of financing and entry into possession by the
108. 234 Ga. 437, 216 S.E.2d 581 (1975).
109. Id. at 440, 216 S.E.2d at 85, quoting 2 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.)
§813. There were two dissenting opinions, and Justice Gunter quotes from Malette v. Wright,
120 Ga. 735, 741, 48 S.E. 229, 232 (1904): "The execution of the deed and placing it upon the
public records was a solemn publication to the world that the grantor had conveyed to the
grantee the land therein described, and the grantor would be estopped from insisting that
one who dealt with his grantee on the faith of the deed must take notice of his possession, so
as to make inquiry whether or not his deed really spoke the truth."
110.

GA. CODE ANN. §84-1421 (1975).

111. 137 Ga. App. 451, 224 S.E.2d 102 (1976).
112. Clover Realty Co. v. McLeod, 124 Ga. App. 160, 183 S.E.2d 33 (1971); Garruth Realty
Co. v. Pire, 17 Wis.2d 89, 115 N.W.2d 557 (1962); Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 1338 (1962); 23
A.L.R.2d 164, 213, §18 (1952).
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purchaser will cure any defects in phrasing." 3 But in Potts v. Smith, "I the
contract stipulated merely that it was "contingent and subject to the purchaser being able to refinance the loan in the amount of $200,000 that is
presently held by Cameron and Brown Mortgage Company." The terms of
refinancing were not set forth, and the court held that the purchaser was
entitled to rescind and to obtain a return of his earnest money from the
broker. The fact that the purchaser at one point in the negotiations notified
the broker that he had obtained a loan commitment and set a date for
closing, the court said, would not raise an estoppel; there must be an actual
meeting of the condition." 5
Another financing clause was involved in Homer v. Savannah Valley
Enterprises, Inc.,"' but there the language withstood attack. It provided
that "[p]urchaser shall arrange for financing within 60 days from date if
possible, if not, sellers shall be responsible for arranging for financing with
the full cooperation of purchaser. . . .If financing cannot be arranged
within 90 days from date purchaser shall commence liquidating the loan
at the rate of $1,000 per month until permanent financing for 10 years can
be arranged.""' 7 The court ruled that a purchaser who took possession
under the contract could not later rescind and recover his payments on the
ground of uncertainty and indefiniteness of the contract. Properly construed, the language meant that title remained in the vendor until the
purchaser obtained a loan to his satisfaction or until the purchase price
was paid at the rate of $1,000 per month. The fact that alternate options
were granted did not create uncertainty.
The undesirability of using a simple street number as a description of
land is again vividly illustrated in Fields v. Davies."t8 The contract called
for property "known as 2003 Pinetree Trail, Gainesville, Georgia." The
purchaser did not discover that his deed, calling for Lot 2 of Sunset
Heights, failed to include half of the adjoining lot, as he had thought, until
several months later, after he had gone into possession and construction
had begun on the adjoining lot. The court regarded the objection as coming
too late, because (1) there was no fraud or mutual mistake, (2) the sales
contract was merged into the deed, and (3) the deed was a complete relinquishment of all conflicting claims under the prior contract of sale. A
purchaser's attorney should always call his client's attention to any impor113. Warren v. Camp, 232 Ga. 681, 208 S.E.2d 489 (1974).
114. 134 Ga. App. 737, 215 S.E.2d 697 (1975).
115. Assuming the truth of the purchaser's statement that he had a satisfactory loan
commitment, would this suffice to show his ability to refinance? The case is somewhat
confused by the fact that it was not a suit between vendor and purchaser, but one to recover
the earnest money from the broker. Estoppel might be regarded as a plea personal to the
vendor in such a case.
116. 234 Ga. 371, 216 S.E.2d 113 (1975).
117. Id. at 372, 216 S.E.2d at 115, n.2.
118. 235 Ga. 87, 218 S.E.2d 828 (1975).
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tant variance in the description between the contract and the deed to avoid
misunderstandings and lawsuits."9
In Walker v. Bush,120 the sales contract required the vendor to give a
warranty deed conveying good and marketable title. At the closing session
she tendered a deed in which a recital was added: "This deed is made
subject to any and all easements or claim of easements." The court agreed
with the purchaser that, by offering only a deed containing the disputed
easement stipulation, the vendor failed to offer good and marketable title
as required, but a question of fact-whether the purchaser actually rejected or accepted the deed-remained. The purchaser testified that she
had left all papers with her attorney "in escrow" for correction of the
description and for further negotiation about the objectionable recital,
while other parties testified that she had agreed to the easement exception.
In most closings the parties leave a stack of signed papers on the table for
handling by the closing attorney, and the legal status of the title may be
in limbo and may depend on conflicting parol testimony about what was
said or done by the parties and their attorneys.' But questions of final
delivery and acceptance are always involved in conveyancing.,,
The hazards of buying land from heirs-at-law are well illustrated in
Thomas v. Harper,2 3 although the story has a happy ending except for the
costs of litigation. A person who purchased land from the surviving
husband of the record owner relied upon the widower's truthful assurance
that he was the sole heir-at-law, since there were no children. The purchaser ascertained that the wife's estate was unadministered and was told
by other persons that she left no will. Actually she did leave a will devising
the property to the husband for life with remainder to a cousin."' It was
shown that the cousin knew about the will and waited five years-until
after the death of the husband named as life tenant-before offering it for
probate. The court sustained the defense that the cousin was estopped by
119. Accord, Stonecypher v. Power Co., 183 Ga. 498, 189 S.E. 13 (1936); Keiley v. Citizens' Say. Bank & Trust Co., 173 Ga. 11, 159 S.E. 527 (1931); Duncan v. McAdams, 222 Ark.
143, 257 S.W.2d 568, 38 A.L.R.2d 1307 (1953). An exception in the attorney's certificate of
title for matters of survey is no protection from liability in this matter. It is his duty to
compare the descriptions in the contract and the deed carefully and advise his client as to
any variance. See Owen v. Neely, 471 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1971).
120. 234 Ga. 366, 216 S.E.2d 285 (1975).
121. Merely signing a deed and leaving it on a table in the attorney's office is not a
delivery or an acceptance. Stokes v. Anderson, 118 Ind. 533, 21 N.E. 331 (1889).
122. Stinson v. Woodland Bank, 154 Ga. 254, 114 S.E. 181 (1922).
123. 235 Ga. 92, 218 S.E.2d 832 (1975).
124. According to §11.4 of the Georgia State Bar Title Standards, good conveyancing
would have required that the purchaser obtain (1) proof showing the death intestate of the
record owner, identifying the heirs at law and showing them to be of age and sound mind,
(2) a conveyance from the heirs-at-law, if competent, (3) an order dispensing with administration or an idemnity agreement, deposit or surety bond against debts of the estate. An affidavit
of the husband with disinterested corroboration would have been sufficient. Here the husband does not appear to have been even questioned about the existence of a will.
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his inaction. The fact that the husband was rightfully in possession as life
tenant did not relieve the cousin from the estoppel, despite the general rule
that a remainderman need not and cannot assert title until termination of
the life estate. The cousin could not have sued for possession, but as a
devisee he could have taken steps to require the probate of the will.
The sales contract in Scata v. Pinnacle Enterprises, Inc.'25 stipulated
that it was "contingent upon purchaser's obtaining a real estate loan not
to exceed $60,000, bearing interest at the best available rate over a term
not to exceed 30 years." The vendor sued the purchaser for breach without
alleging whether the contingency had been met, and the court upheld a
dismissal of the complaint on motion. Prior decisions already had held
language of this type too vague for enforcement, since the amount to be
borrowed is indefinite, as are the terms of repayment and the rate of
interest. 28 Apparently in Scata the validity of the contract was not questioned. Only the fact that the condition had not been alleged (either by
general or special allegations) to have occurred was questioned, since the
purchaser was under no liability until he had obtained a loan. But under
either theory, the vendor loses his case. Actually, the earlier cases have
gone too far in requiring meticulous details of the proposed loan. Perhaps
the most extreme example is Hicks v. Stucki,'2 which rejected the contract
attempting to describe a proposed loan (even though specifying a definite
amount, rate of interest and amount of monthly payments) because it
failed to state that the loan was to be upon the security of the property
sold and to state from whom the loan was to be obtained. These are the
sort of cases which may have earned Georgia a national reputation for
judicial stringency. 2 '
Cullens v. Woodruff 29 is a recent example of modern trends toward the
rejection of the ancient caveat emptor doctrine. 130 The sales contract was
for land upon which stood a partially finished house that was to be completed by the vendor. The contract provided: "Effective with final acceptance and closing of house by purchaser, seller warrants construction for a
period of one year, reasonable wear and tear excluded." After the purchaser closed the sale and took possession, he sued the vendor for $15,000
damages on grounds of breach of warranty and negligence in construction.
The first defense was that the provisions of the sales contract merged into
125. 136 Ga. App. 451, 221 S.E.2d 660 (1975).
126. Roberts v. Maxwell, 94 Ga. App. 406, 94 S.E.2d 764 (1956) (indefinite amount);
Bonner v. Jordon, 218 Ga. 129, 126 S.E.2d 613 (1962) (indefinite terms of payment and rate
of interest).
127. 109 Ga. App. 723, 137 S.E.2d 399 (1964).
128. See Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 1338 (1962); Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 287 (1949); Annot., 60
A.L.R.2d 251 (1958).
129. 137 Ga. App. 262, 223 S.E.2d 293 (1976).
130. There is no implied warranty in the sale of land. GA. CODE ANN. §29-302 (1969).
Physical defects in the property give a purchaser no right of action unless there is deliberate
fraud or concealment. Davis v. Pittman, 70 Ga. App. 504, 28 S.E.2d 664 (1944).

REAL PROPERTY

19761

the deed and became unenforceable. Not so, answered the court. The
intention was clear that the warranty of construction was intended to
survive the consummation of the sale; so the doctrine of caveat emptor,
which ordinarily shields the real property vendor, cannot be applicable.,3'
XV.

STREETS, ROADS AND HIGHWAYS

A sales contract provided: "Seller warrants that the property has access
to Holcombe Bridge Road as shown and designated on a plat [attached
to the contract]." A suit was brought by the purchaser, who sought either
to establish access against the adjoining owners or to obtain damages for
breach of the warranty. The access road shown on the plat was alleged to
have been discontinued by a quitclaim deed from the county that recited
consideration of one dollar and purported to convey to the adjoining owner
the entire tract within which the road lay. The opinion of the supreme
court, Stein v. Maddox, "I furnishes title attorneys with several valuable
rulings on the process of closing county roads. Both the statute in force at
the time of the quitclaim and the present law, although in different language, required notice to adjoining owners, and compliance with this requirment was not shown. The court avoids any objection on this score,
however; the court said that the plaintiff, as successor in title to the abutting owner at the date of the deed, did not acquire a right to object to the
closing, since a right of action for injuries already inflicted upon land will
not pass as an appurtenance with a transfer of title unless there is a specific
assignment.' 3' Nor was the plaintiff entitled as a citizen and taxpayer to
attack the deed, because all road closings are presumed beneficial to the
county in relieving it of maintenance expense and no evidence to the contrary was offered.'34 The recital of nominal consideration in the county
deed did not indicate a breach of trust, since it was shown that the land
occupied by the road had no market value. 35 Nor was it a valid objection
131.

See Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults upon the Rule,

14 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1961).

132. 234 Ga. 164, 215 S.E.2d 231 (1975).
133. Dougherty County v. Pylant, 104 Ga. App. 468, 122 S,E.2d 117 (1961). But if there
has been no valid closing, the easement of access over the road would remain in effect and
would pass as an appurtenance, even though it is not so specified. Wimpey v. Smart, 137 Ga.
325, 73 S.E. 586 (1912). And it is generally said that a conveyance of the fee simple vests in
the grantee all of the grantor's rights in the property, including a right of action for breach of
a condition in another deed under which title reverted to the grantor. Evans v. Brown, 196
Ga. 634, 27 S.E.2d 300 (1943).
134. The court cited Marietta Chair Co. v. Henderson, 121 Ga. 399, 407, 49 S.E.312, 316
(1904), where Justice Cobb mentions relief from maintenance expenses as a possible benefit.
But could the county give away its courthouse for which maintenance costs are much higher?
Most county property is expensive to maintain, and this may justify a sale but not a gift.
135. Since county commissioners are trustees, they have no authority to give away county
property or easements. Whenever a fiduciary's deed recites nominal consideration, extrinsic
evidence is required to show some valuable benefit actually received; otherwise, the transac-
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that the deed described the entire tract of the grantee's land instead of
merely the strip occupied by the old road, where the resolution clearly
showed the intention of dealing only with the roadway.
In Ross v. Hall County Board of Commissioners,'36 the court dealt with
certain streets or roads platted out by a corporate subdivider, which sold
off the adjacent lots by reference to the subdivision plat. There was also a
deed to the county, but it was considered to be ineffectively executed by
the president of the corporation rather than by the corporation itself.' 7 Yet
the county was held subject to mandamus proceedings brought to compel
maintenance at public expense. The sale of lots by reference to the subdivision plat will suffice as a dedication of roads to the public if acceptance is
shown. Here there was no official record of acceptance on the minutes of
the county government, but the county had worked on the roads regularly
after they were "blacktopped" by the developer. This established an implied acceptance. One dissenting justice questioned the result because of
evidence that the subdivider continued to maintain a guardhouse at the
entrance to the subdivision and in that way denied access to the general
public.
MetropolitanAtlanta Rapid TransitAuthority v. Datry'3 was a difficult

chapter in MARTA's struggle for completion, but it yielded some valuable
rulings on the nature of streets and the rights of abutting owners. The plan
under review called for converting a block of Sycamore Street in Decatur
into a pedestrian mall; adjoining business properties would lose all vehicular access to their premises except for emergencies. The court first recognized that the base fee in the street was vested in the adjoining owners,
subject to the public easement, but the court approved the proposed construction of a mall as a proper use of the public easement of travel. The
court added, however, that depriving the abutting owners of their right of
vehicular access is a compensable taking of their property rights, and it
must be accomplished by condemnation and paid for by the city. The use
of part of the area for a substation must also be compensated. Three
justices dissented.
XVI.

FAMILY ALLOWANCES FROM DECEDENTS' ESTATES (YEARS' SUPPORT)

The maverick Georgia statute providing for awards of real estate to
widows and minor children of deceased husbands and fathers was amended
g
in 1976'W
by requiring certificates from the probate court to be recorded
on the deed records and to identify the minors by full name, birthdate if
tion is open to attack by the beneficiaries of the trust (here, any citizen or taxpayer). State
Highway Board v. Price, 174 Ga. 143, 162 S.E. 283 (1931).
136. 235 Ga. 309, 219 S.E.2d 380 (1975).
137. See Bowers v. Salitan, 97 Ga. App. 877, 104 S.E.2d 667 (1958).
138. 235 Ga. 568, 220 S.E.2d 905 (1975).
139. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 1059, amending GA. CODE ANN. §113-1002 (et seq.
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known, and age and identify unborn children by describing them as such
under the father's surname. The recording clerk must enter the certificate
on the deed records in the county where the land lies and index it in the
names of the decedent as grantor and the widow and children as grantees.
The question remains whether not complying with the act will invalidate
the award or merely protect purchasers without notice.
The recent decision in Allan v. Allan"4 ° is of urgent importance to the
bar. Following the trend already indicated by the court of appeals," the
supreme court applied constitutional standards of notice and hearing to
the Georgia Year's Support Statutes and ruled that the devisee of specific
property was constitutionally entitled to notice of a year's-support proceeding that would supersede the devise by transferring title to the widow.
Notice by publication, said the court, will not suffice with respect to persons whose names and addresses are known or very easily ascertainable
and whose legally protected interests are directly affected. The opinion is
expressly not retroactive to proceedings antedating the decision.4 2 Since
there is no statute requiring notice, other than by publication, to devisees
under the husband's will,' appropriate legislation is badly needed. And
the basic principle of Allan v. Allan may also be applicable to administrators' sales and other proceedings in the probate court. In this connection,
the adoption of the new Uniform Probate Code should be carefully considered.
XVII.

ZONING

Barrett v. Hamby' injects some new viewpoints into the usual handsoff posture of the courts toward questions of reasonableness and discretion
in zoning requlations. It was shown that the property zoned for residential
uses adjoined a commercial zone and was unfit for residential use; so the
140. 236 Ga. 199, 223 S.E.2d 445 (1976).
141. Outlaw v. Outlaw, 121 Ga. App. 284, 173 S.E.2d 459 (1970), holding that a minor
grandson by a deceased child of the husband was not bound by a year's support award where
he was not notified. See also Lewis v. Lewis, 228 Ga. 703, 187 S.E.2d 872 (1972). A previous
constitutional attack on the statute was rejected because the record showed that the heirs in
question had actual notice of the proceeding and filed caveats. Payne v. Bradford, 231 Ga.
487, 202 S.E.2d 422 (1973).
142. The court quotes from Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S.
371, 374 (1939): "The past cannot be erased by a new judicial declaration.... Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have
finality and acted upon accordingly . . . demand examination ....
An all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
143. There is a general provision for service of notice upon interested parties by the sheriff,
GA. CODE ANN. §24-2105 (1971), but it does not specifically require such service in year's
support proceedings, and the court in Allan v. Allan seems to feel that any form of actual
notice would suffice under Payne v. Bradford, supra note 135, 231 Ga. 487, 202 S.E.2d 422
(1973).
144. 235 Ga. 262, 219 S.E.2d 399 (1975).
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effect of the classification was to render the property virtually worthless.
The court, with two dissents and one special concurrence, lays down the
proposition that a zoning ordinance so applied violates the constitutional
prohibition against taking private property without compensation unless
it can be justified as bearing a substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morality or public welfare. In the absence of such justification it
will be set aside as arbitrary or unreasonable." 5
Under a 1976 statute each county and each city in Georgia or any combination of such political subdivisons may exercise the power of zoning."
XVH.

LEGISLATION

The 1976 General Assembly passed legislation dealing with survivorship
deeds;'47 providing for scenic and facade easements; 4 ' virtually affixing the
character of trust funds to money paid to a contractor or another person
for real-property improvements;" ' requiring awards of year's support to be
recorded on deed records;' allowing each county or city in the state or any
combination of the political subdivisions to exercise zoning power;' 51 regulating interest rates; 52 providing a new statute of limitations for actions
5
under the Georgia Land Sales Act;'1
requiring notices of taxes due and of
assessments to state both the fair market value of the land and the assessed
value under the 40% rule; '- and validating the 10% penalty for assessments
of unreturned property by apecifying that the meaning is 10% of the
amount of the tax.'5 5 The legislature also passed a new Landlord and Tenant Act that deals with residential leases but exempts the small landlord.'I
145. The court cited Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); City of Thomson v. Davis,
92 Ga. App. 216, 220, 88 S.E.2d 300 (1955).
146. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 1014.
147. See a discussion in the text accompanying notes 40-41, supra.
148. See text accompanying notes 51-52, supra.
149. See text accompanying note 84, supra.
150. See text accompanying note 139, supra.
151. See note 146 and accompanying text.
152. Ga. Laws, 1976, pp. 1197 and 726; GA. CODE ANN. §57-116 (Supp. 1976).
153. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 676.
154. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 518; GA. CODE ANN. §92-5703 (Supp. 1976).
155. GA. CODE ANN. §92-6913 (Supp. 1976).
156. See a discussion in the text accompanying notes 67-70, supra.

